Thank you very much, Senator.

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, I want to thank you for this

opportunity to discuss our strategic objectives in Sudan and to outline

what we’re doing to make them a reality.

Mr. Chairman, we greatly appreciate your leadership on these

issues, your commitment to resolving the significant challenges

that we find in Sudan. I know this commitment is shared by all

members of this committee. We sincerely appreciate the dedicated

efforts of Senator Feingold, chairman of the Africa Subcommittee,

and Senator Isakson, the ranking member of that committee.

I just returned, as you noted, from Sudan last week, and as I visited

Darfur, Abyei in the South, I was reminded again of the great

humanitarian tragedies that have occurred in that country. Many

people in Sudan have suffered terribly from the pain and loss that

conflict brings. It’s for these people, for future generations of Sudanese,

that we are striving to make a difference.

Let me tell you what we want to achieve. We want a country

that’s governed responsibly, justly, democratically; a country that’s

at peace with itself and its neighbors, that’s economically viable; a

country that works together with the United States with common

interests. We want an inclusive and durable peace in Darfur. We

want full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

We want a peaceful post-referendum period, whether a single, stable,

and united Sudan, or a Sudan that divides, peaceably and

orderly, into two separate states. We want only what’s best for the

Sudanese people.

That’s our vision. And to make it a reality, we’re using all elements

of national power: diplomacy; defense; and development.

We’re currently engaging with all relevant parties inside of Sudan

to bring peace and stability to that country. We have weekly discussions

with leaders from the two parties of the Government of

National Unity, the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s

Liberation Movement, as well as regular talks from representatives

from critical parties—the other parties—and movements and

civil society.

To accomplish our goals, we’re also engaging with Sudan’s neighbors

and the international community, and that’s why I’ve traveled

to Chad, to China, Egypt, France, Libya, Norway, Qatar, and the

United Kingdom to meet with key leaders who share our common

concern, who want to work together with us on shared objectives.

We’re dedicated to carrying out our vision of success.

I report regularly to the President and to Secretary Clinton

about the progress that we’ve made, and I’ve visited Congress to

exchange views with you and members—and a number of your colleagues.

I look forward to speaking with you many more times in

the weeks ahead.

Now, let me detail some of the specific aspects of our strategic

approach. Most urgently, we seek a definitive end to the conflict

and the gross human-rights abuses in Darfur, and a justice for its

many victims. We can never forget the lives needlessly lost over the

last 5 years, the millions who continue to be displaced. Families

still crowd into makeshift housing in IDP camps. Women continue

to gather firewood in fear. Children are growing up without a hope

for a better tomorrow. That must end.

To resolve the humanitarian tragedy, we’re striving to facilitate

and negotiate a political settlement between the Government of

Sudan and all parties to the conflict. Our goal is to conclude an

agreement that will bring a sustainable peace to Darfur, that will

allow people back to their home villages or places that they desire

to move to, to resume their lives in safety and stability and

security.

The second aspect of our strategy focuses on sustaining that fragile

peace between the North and the South. Sudan, as you said,

will hold elections in 8 months, and the referenda, in January

2011. Our timeline is so very tight, our task is so very great, but

we have no option but success.

The third aspect is to prepare the Government of Sudan and the

Government of Southern Sudan for the post-referenda period, in

unity or in peaceful coexistence. Our strategy seeks to find a delicate

balance between improving security forces and developing the

social governance and economic infrastructure required for growth.

The last aspect of our strategy seeks to increase and enhance cooperation

with the Sudanese Government, to counterterrorism and

to promote regional security. I believe we have a golden opportunity

now to make a big difference in Sudan. As you can see, we’re

aiming high, we’re thinking big, and we’re expecting much. Failure

cannot be an option. We must proceed with boldness, with hard

work to make this proactive and preventative approach work right

now.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you for

your leadership, for your support to end the suffering in Sudan.

And thank you again for allowing me to be here today to discuss

these issues, concerns that need our urgent attention, critical problems

that must resolve—be resolved—for all the people of Sudan.

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our strategic

objectives in Sudan and to outline what we are doing to make them a reality.

Mr. Chairman, let me begin by acknowledging your leadership on these issues.

We greatly appreciate your commitment to finding solutions to the many challenges

confronting the people of Sudan. That commitment is widely shared by the members

of this committee, including Senator Feingold, chairman of the Africa Subcommittee,

with whom I have recently met, and Senator Isakson, ranking member of the subcommittee.

We are especially grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and Senators Corker

and Isakson for participating in the State Department’s Forum for Supporters of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which we held here in Washington last

month. I will say more about those proceedings in a few moments, but I want to

thank you now for your support.

The great human tragedies that have occurred in Darfur and the rest of Sudan

are deeply embedded in our memories. Many people in Sudan suffer terribly from

the pain and loss brought by conflict, and it is these people who deserve our

support.

We have made progress in recent months, but we have much work ahead. From

my visits to Sudan, the region, and throughout the international community, I have

found the challenges in Sudan to be complex and our timeline compressed. Because

of the complicated nature and urgency of the tasks at hand, we have helped to

craft a strategic approach that blends all elements on national power and a methodology

that is integrated, comprehensive, and based on a policy of dialogue and

engagement.

I want to take a moment to discuss our engagement. Engagement is not something

we pursue for its own sake, and it is not about accommodating the status quo.

Engagement does not mean the absence of pressure, or doling out incentives based

on wishful thinking. On the contrary, it is about working to change conditions on

the ground. Engagement means frank dialogue about what needs to be accomplished

in the months ahead, how we can help make those accomplishments happen, how

the bilateral relationship could improve if conditions on the ground transform, how

the Government of Sudan could become even more isolated if it does not act now,

and how we ensure that all parties are held accountable.

First let me tell you what we want to achieve. We want a country that is governed

responsibly, justly, and democratically; a country that is at peace with itself and

with its neighbors, that is economically viable; and a country that works together

with the United States on common interests. We want an inclusive and durable

peace in Darfur. We want full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

and a peaceful post-referendum period whether as a single, stable, and unified

Sudan or a Sudan that divides peacefully and orderly into two separate states. We

want only what is best for the Sudanese people.

This is our vision. Now let me tell you how we’re going to make it a reality. We

are using diplomacy, defense, and development—all the elements of national

power—to achieve our strategic objectives.

We are engaging directly with all of the relevant parties inside Sudan to bring

peace and stability to the country. This includes the two main parties of the Government

of National Unity (GNU)—the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan

People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), as well as other political parties and movements

and civil society. We have traveled to the country three times since my

appointment in March, and returned just a few days ago from our last trip. We were

in Khartoum to facilitate trilateral talks to advance timely implementation of the

CPA and in Darfur to review our progress on facilitating humanitarian assistance

and to promote the Doha peace process. I visited several camps for internally displaced

persons, met with camp leaders, and saw firsthand the day-to-day struggles

these Darfuris must face. Ultimately, the Government of Sudan must be accountable

to its people and bear responsibility for peace within Sudan’s borders.

To achieve our goals, we must also engage with Sudan’s neighbors and the international

community. This is why we have traveled around the world to Chad,

China, Egypt, France, Libya, Norway, Qatar, and the United Kingdom to meet with

key leaders who share our common concern and want to work together toward

shared objectives. This is why, at the end of June, we convened the Forum for Supporters

of the CPA here in Washington to bring together representatives from over

30 countries and international organizations to renew the global commitment to seeing

a peaceful and stable Sudan. We are confident that this multilateral group will

work closely together to achieve a lasting peace in Sudan by keeping Sudanese parties

positively engaged in implementing the peace agreement and preparing for the

future, increasing the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan, and helping

to keep all Sudanese Government institutions accountable to their people.

We are dedicated to carrying this vision to success. I have built a team of sharp

and dedicated individuals who, along with our colleagues based in Sudan, are working

tirelessly to achieve our objectives. My role is to guide our vision, and I will do

all that is in my power to see this vision come to fruition. I report regularly to President

Obama and Secretary Clinton about our progress and have visited Congress

to exchange views with you and a number of your colleagues. I look forward to

speaking with many more of you in the weeks ahead. We are committed to working

together as a strong and united team to achieve our objectives of a politically stable,

physically secure, economically viable, and peaceful Sudan.

Now let me tell you more about the four pillars required to support this vision

of Sudan. Most urgently, we want a definitive end to conflict and gross human

rights abuses in Darfur and justice for its many victims. We can never forget the

lives needlessly lost in the last 5 years, and the millions who continue to be displaced.

As I witnessed last week, families still crowd into makeshift housing in IDP

camps, women continue to gather firewood in fear, and children grow up without

hope for a better tomorrow.

To resolve this humanitarian tragedy, we believe only a negotiated political settlement

between the Government of Sudan and all parties to the conflict will bring

sustainable peace to Darfur. Our goal is to conclude an agreement that will allow

people to go back to their home villages or a place of their choosing to resume their

lives in safety, stability, self-sufficiency, and security.

Past peace negotiations have faltered, and we have learned from these experiences.

We are collaborating with the African Union and United Nations joint chief

mediator, Djibrill Bassole´, to ensure that the peace process is inclusive and that it

adequately addresses the grievances of the people of Darfur. We are engaging with

the fragmented movements in Darfur to help them unite and to bring them to the

peace table with one voice. We are working with Libya and Egypt to end the proxy

war between Chad and Sudan that has ignited further conflict. We are supporting

the full deployment of the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur

(UNAMID) as a critical mechanism for protecting Darfuri civilians. We are determined

to work toward a peaceful Darfur where displaced families can resettle and

reestablish their homes. We must act without delay—innocent Darfuris have suffered

for too long.

Our second pillar focuses on sustaining peace between the North and the South.

In January 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation

Movement signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ending a 22-year war. Four

and a half years after the signing of the CPA, peace remains fragile. In just 8

months, Sudan will hold national elections in April 2010 and referenda in Southern

Sudan and the Abyei region beginning 9 months later in January 2011. Our

timeline is so very short; it is urgent that we act now to support the full implementation

of the CPA.

This will not be easy. Just over a week ago, the Permanent Court of Arbitration

in The Hague announced its arbitration decision on the Abyei border delineation—

a highly sensitive and emotional issue for both parties to the CPA. Before the

boundary decision was handed down, we spent a significant amount of time with

the parties, working to ensure the decision would be accepted and fully implemented.

Tensions in Abyei remain high and the international community must continue

to be vigilant. As we have seen before in that area, tensions between the Ngok

Dinka and Misseriya can quickly erupt into violence, resulting in a conflict that

could bring the SPLM and NCP into direct confrontation and threaten to derail the

CPA.

We will also need to continue support for the U.N. Mission in Sudan, help the

parties prepare for elections in April, and ensure legitimate popular consultations

in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Collectively, we must assist the parties

as they prepare for the January 2011 referenda and their consequences. These are

just a few of the major challenges ahead as we help the parties implement the

remaining milestones in the CPA.

It is critical that we work with the parties to begin the process of democratic

transformation and decentralization, so that in January 2011, the voices of the people

of Southern Sudan will be heard and we can witness a unified and peaceful

Sudan or a Sudan that is on an orderly path toward becoming two separate and

viable states at peace with each other. Resolving the issues of North and South is

critical to tackling challenges in Darfur and other parts of the country. These twin

challenges must be addressed with equal attention and vigor.

The third pillar calls for a functioning and stable Sudanese Government, and one

that will either include a capable Government of Southern Sudan or coexist peacefully

with an independent Southern Sudan. Our strategy seeks to help the South

improve its security capacity to defend against external and internal threats while

striving to ensure a potentially independent Southern Sudan is politically and economically

viable.

Our fourth and final pillar is to seek increased and enhanced cooperation with the

Sudanese Government to counter terrorism and to promote regional security, consistent

with—and not at the expense of—our overall objectives of peace and security

in Sudan. We also seek an end to Sudan’s efforts to weaken or marginalize opponents

abroad or align with negative state and nonstate actors.

Our whole-of-government approach is integrated and comprehensive. It is firmly

founded in the belief that engagement with all of Sudan, the region, the international

community, and civil society is essential if we are to secure our vision of

a Sudan that is ruled more justly and democratically, is at peace with itself and

with its neighbors, is economically viable, and works together with the United

States on our shared interests. Further, our strategy is deeply rooted in a conviction

that we must do all we can to end the human suffering in Sudan.

As you can see, we are aiming high, thinking big, and expecting much. We do so

because we believe innovative concepts and ideas, coupled with detailed planning

and sufficient resources, are the only way to achieve big results. Big results are

exactly what we need in Sudan at this critical moment.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to thank you for your

leadership and support on efforts to end the suffering in Darfur and the rest of

Sudan. Again, thank you for allowing me to be here today to discuss these issues

that are so important to us all, and especially to the Sudanese people.

Yes, sir. What we’re doing right now is trying

to cope with a situation that is very dire and very severe. Obviously,

the camps continue to have grave problems, and we’re trying

to ensure that they have the basic necessities to ensure the essentials

of life.

On the ground, we still see instability and insecurity, and what

we’re trying to do right now is achieve a lasting and durable peace.

To do that, we’ve gotten agreements from the Government of

Sudan to put a unilateral cease-fire in. We’re trying to reduce the

tensions between Chad and Sudan, and reduce the cross-border

rebel activities that has continued to stir instability. And we’re

working with the Government of Sudan to come up with a plan to

disarm militias that have been put along the border by the Government

of Sudan, and we’re working with UNAMID, and we’re coming

up with a plan—a law-enforcement type of plan—to ensure that

warlords who sponsor Janjaweed, autonomous Janjaweed, and

other people that continue to terrorize populations, are dealt with.

This is a tough problem and needs to be done comprehensively, and

that’s why your statement about UNAMID is very important.

They are currently operating out of Sudan, but

it’s true that they get medical support and other support still from

within Sudan. What—I mean in Chad—what we’re working with is

the Government of Chad to reduce overt support, and even quieter

support, in terms of logistics, to this movement.

Yes. It’s very true that JEM has been as far

as Omdurman and threatening Khartoum. And it’s also true that

Sudanese-backed Chadian forces have been close to N’Djamena.

What we’re trying to do, in working with the Libyans and other

leaders around the region, is to reduce the support, to stop that

proxy war, to get rid of the surrogates that are destabilizing. We’re

also working with MINURCAT and UNAMID to come up with a

monitoring agreement, so that the cross-border areas are monitored,

so that the forces can’t go back and create damage.

It is very clear that, in the beginning, the Government

of Khartoum used the Janjaweed to destabilize the population,

to wreak havoc. It is now my view that some of these groups

have gone autonomous, some are not totally controlled by the government,

although I believe that there are still linkages that we

have to pursue. We’re taking a look at this problem in a comprehensive

way, to take a look at what motivates them and how can

we stop them, both from government support and also local law enforcement.

Initially there was denial that they had anything

to do with them. Now we’re getting more acceptance that

they have a role in fixing this problem, and we’re making progress

on working together with the Government of Khartoum to stop

their support.

It’s getting significantly better, but that

doesn’t mean we have to stop our efforts. It appears, last month,

that there were 16 people that died a violent death, and 12 of them

were from criminal kind of things, so we need to keep working it.

One death is too many, from violence. And we’ll continue to work

with law enforcement agencies. But, we have been able to reduce

the violence because we’ve been able to turn off, to a large degree,

the proxy war. And some of that happened when the Government

of Sudan bloodied the nose of JEM at Umm Baru. So, that resulted

in a decreased activity.

Yes, sir. I believe that, just looking at the

facts, there’s significant difference between what happened in 2004

and—2003, which we characterize as genocide—and what is happening today. We are working very hard to make sure that we can

close the gap, though, and end that violence. Right now, currently,

as we speak, we’re working to reunify rebel groups from Abdul

Wahed’s people, from Yahya. We’re bringing in other people to

come together and work for a comprehensive peace and to be part

of the solution. There’s more that can be done, but you’re exactly

correct, the level of violence that we’re seeing right now is not a

coordinated violence, but it is violence that we must end, and, in

fact, as there’s other areas of Sudan where the violence is considerably

greater.

Yes, sir. We are now separate from AF,

although Johnnie Carson and I work very closely together. We’re

very close friends, we coordinate all the time, and we make sure—

because we bump up against Chad, and we bump up against everything

else that Johnnie’s working—we have to be in very, very

close coordination. And we are.

But, we are the Sudan desk. We’ve taken over the administrative

responsibilities, we’ve taken over all those kinds of things where

we support the State Department.

And so, yes, we are independent. And I think, right now, until

we get the situation stabilized—and I believe that’ll probably be

into 2011—I believe we should remain as the Sudan desk in the

State Department, focusing on a comprehensive approach, but integrated

with Johnnie in a way that makes sense.

We are working to get more staff. Right now I believe that we

need to have more presence on the ground in Sudan. Our activities

in Darfur are four-pronged, with the rebel unification, with the

political process, with pulling together civil society, with working

with UNAMID. We need more staff there. In the South, you probably

know we’ve been working on 12 areas, and we reached agreement

between SPLM and NCP on things like border demarcation

and Abyei and wealth-sharing and those kind of things. We need

somebody on the ground to make sure that those things don’t fall

apart and that we meet the deadlines.

We also need somebody in Khartoum to help us out. And then

if we go to Doha, we’re probably going to need a presence in Doha

to make sure that that stays on track. We need more people, and

we’re asking the State Department to help us get more people.

Yes, sir. We’ve gotten through detailees and

secondments. I think we’ve filled up our personal staff and our

office staff OK. We’ve made a request for three more full-time

equivalents, and we also made a request, if we couldn’t get that,

to use contractors. Both of those were turned down, but we’re in

the process of raising them to the next level.

You’re exactly correct. We have to get unity

there, and that’s what we’ve tried to do.

We have several initiatives, before I go into the specific ones that

you talk about. We’ve reactivated the troika. And I was just in Oslo

in the—2 weeks ago, to meet with the U.K. and with the Norwegians.

That was a very important process in bringing about the

CPA. We have a contact group in Europe that we’ve elevated up

to, again, give us inputs and to help us work issues. But, more specifically,

I was in Beijing, a month and a half ago, and Ambassador

Zhou Wenzhong is a great friend, we’ve served in Africa together

in the early 1980s, and we’ve been able to work that. And now the

Chinese are working with us. So, we’re not building roads in parallel,

but we’re putting one on front of the other one. We’re actually

coordinating our humanitarian assistance.

Russia—Markelov and I are working on a conference, possibly in

the first part of October, where we’ll get together in Moscow.

But, there is an effort to bring these players in. We now have

what we call the ‘‘Envoy Six,’’ where countries that have permanent

envoys get together on a routine basis. We actually have a

bigger group, where countries that have representatives in addition—

and so, we have 15 people that get together periodically to

try to work these issues. We’ve shown support to the Doha process.

All the envoys showed up, all the envoys came here to Washington

when we had our forum. So, we continue to build that team in the

international community.

But, you’re exactly correct, that is so important that we do that

together.

Yes, sir. They only get about 6 percent of their

oil from Sudan, but it’s significant. The converse is really where it’s

significant, as the South gets all their income from oil proceeds.

And so, oil is significantly important to the South, and even to the

North.

And so—but, China and the United States and other members of

the international community who have investments or responsibilities

in Sudan have exactly the same agenda. We want security. We

want stability. They want it to protect their investment, we want

it because of the people and the future of that region, and the security

and prosperity of that region.

We have been in a process to come up with a

comprehensive and an integrative strategy. The National Security

Council is leading that process. Of course, we’ve had input, as have

other agencies in the Department.

We anticipate that, within the next few weeks, that we’ll be able

to have a rollout of this strategy, and I think you’ll see from this

strategy that it is very comprehensive, and it’s based on what we’re

trying to achieve, which is a better life for the people there. We’re

trying to achieve a peace and a security and a stability and economic

viability, and the things you talked about—the CPA, peace

in Darfur, making sure that the whole region is secure. And the

strategy includes both incentives and pressures. And it includes

ways to judge if we’re making the progress that we all want to

make.

This isn’t about just my judgment. This is about coming together

and making sure that the United States objectives are being met

and that we’re doing it in a way that makes sense for our country.

And we’ll continue to coordinate with the command process, the

interagency process, to make sure that we stay on track, and we’ll

certainly consult with Congress to ensure that your views and

inputs are incorporated.

Let me just step back and explain what happened,

and why we started this process.

When I became the special envoy, the NGOs had just been

kicked out. But my mandate was to get those 13 NGOs back in.

It was very clear that we weren’t going to be able to do that. But,

the President also gave me the mandate to save lives, and in an

effort to save lives, we worked to get new NGOs in, to restore that

capability, but not only to restore, but to create an environment

that would actually be significantly better than it was on the 4th

of March.

But, this meant two things. If we were going to get this, we

needed to have a relationship so we could discuss with Khartoum.

Also, as I went to Juba, I realized if we were going to solve the

CPA issues we had to have a relationship with both Juba, which

we had, and Khartoum; we had to have a foot in both camps. If

we were going to solve the problems along the border with Chad,

we had to have a foot in Khartoum and a foot in N’Djamena. So,

it became very clear that at some point we had to have a relationship

so that we could discuss options. And that’s what we did early.

But, that doesn’t preclude or negate anything that the strategy

is trying to do. In fact, it is—it gives a foundation for the strategy,

and the strategy builds on having relationships, not only within

Sudan, but with its neighbors and the international community.

There’s no question. I’d be happy to come up

and brief you, in a more secure environment, on what those are.

But, I believe we have a very balanced approach that includes both

incentives and includes pressures. And in many ways, the lack of

incentives is turning out to be also a pressure. We will continue to

use all methods, all incentives and pressures, in a balanced way.

But, one thing I would like to say as a caveat to this is that what

we’re finding out is that—as you already know—that this is a very

complex issue, and there’s a lot of multiple things happening at the

same time. And so, we’re having to take a look at this, not in terms

of specific actions, and sticks and carrots, and things like that,

associated with specific actions, but them in concert with everything

else that’s going on in the country.

So, we’re looking at an integrated approach that looks at, What

is the actions that are being done on the CPA? What are the

actions that are being done on the humanitarian front? What are

the actions that are being done to put together a political process

so people can have their will known and carried out? And what is

being done to increase security for the whole region? And that’s

what we’re judging this on—not specifics, but more of a general

way——

I’ll be happy to.

I totally agree. Be happy to come and brief you

on these.

You’re exactly correct. And it’s something that

really bothers me. And fact is, when I was at Kalma and Kass, I

learned that the Sudanese can’t even go in those camps—I mean,

the government and security—and the security is inside.

We—there’s—I think there’s one ultimate answer, and that is to

be able to have security over the country and stability over the

country, and so these people can return to their homes and live in

dignity with respect. But, how do you draw the dots between where

we are right now and where we’re trying to achieve? And that’s

very, very tough.

And so, what we’ve been doing is working with UNAMID to come

up with a plan for security sectors. That’s underneath the overall

cease-fire, cessation of hostilities that we’re trying to get. We’re trying

make concentrated cease-fire zones and corridors so that people

will be able to go out and collect firewood, so they will be able to

go out and start farms, so they can start an alternative form of getting

food, as opposed to just getting the handouts. And it’s going

to start by moving in concentric rings or along corridors that start

where these camps are, so people can start moving out in safety.

But, you’re exactly correct, the situation that we face today is

unacceptable. The gender-based violence is unacceptable. And we

are working very hard, with our humanitarian groups, NGOs, to

stop this, because it’s not right, and it has to end. And that is a

high priority for me.

We’ve submitted our suggestions to the

UNAMID mandate. That was in July. And we’re now working with

MINURCAT and UNAMID to come up with a better mandate, in

anticipation of a political process that ends up in a comprehensive

cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities. At that point, the mandate’s

going to have to include more things, like monitoring that

cease-fire, like working the borders, and working these zones.

And you’re exactly right. As currently written, I don’t think it’s

strong enough, and we need to fix that. And then we also need to

ensure they have the capabilities, which may mean more aerial

assets to do surveillance, and it may mean a new command-and control

system that allows UNAMID to work with local law enforcement

agencies, to work with the local government, and rebel

forces that exist in that region, to have a comprehensive law enforcement

and the cover that we need to do exactly what you’re

talking about, which is that security piece.

Yes sir, you’re exactly correct. There’s no evidence,

in our intelligence community, that supports being on the

state sponsor of terrorism. It’s a political decision.

What we have found, though, is the consequences of the sanctions

that have resulted from that, and other sanctions, are preventing

us from doing the development that we absolutely need to

do. The heavy equipment that must come in to build railroads and

roads has to come in through Port Sudan or Khartoum; it is sanctioned.

And so, what’s happening is, we’re hurting, not only at the local

level, the humanitarian level—the people, because they can’t

download educational programs and that kind of thing—but, in

addition to that, we’re actually hurting the very development

things we need to do to help the South become able, if they choose,

to secede, a viable economic state; those things are now sanctioned.

And so, you’re exactly right. At some point, we’re going to have

to unwind some of these sanctions so that we can do the very

things we need to do to ensure a peaceful transition and a state

that’s viable in the South, should they choose to do that.

I’d say that that’s probably a fair analysis.

Yes. Let me just touch back on the women

thing. What we’ve found is that if we’re going to fix the problems

in Sudan, we have to start with the women. If we start with the

women, the communities come along. And so, you’re totally right,

we have to restore their respect, their dignity, and their safety, and

we have to use them as the centerpiece for really working the

humanitarian and the development things that will come later.

But, on UNAMID, we’re at about between 65 and 67 percent

right now. And in talking to the United Nations while I was there

on the field, they basically said that by the end of the year they

should be at 92 percent of pledged forces. As you know, we’ve been

working very hard trying to facilitate the Mi-35s coming in from

Ethiopia, but they still have significant gaps. And, I would say, an

area that’s affecting us—in addition to the mandate that needs to

be adjusted, as was pointed out—command-and-control elements,

strategic planning, logistics planning, are probably things where

we need to help beef up the support. In terms of soldiers, I think

we’re beginning to see a fill there.

But, in the technical piece, if we have to get into this monitoring

piece, if we start doing intel-sharing on border activities between

the two groups, we’re probably going to need more analysis and

more work on the intelligence side. And certainly if we start the

monitoring, and we use either overhead aerial platforms for reconnaissance

and surveillance, we’re going to need more of the high tech

piece.

But, those things—it’s probably too premature to ask for them

right now, but I believe we need to start planning now so that we

can get these elements in if we’re successful in the peace process.

Our plan is, we’re looking at AFRICOM coming

up with eight individuals that fit that billet of planners, and

also helping with the command-and-control element. And we—as

we continue on in the peace process and define the requirements

better—I’ll be very honest with you, in the past we had not defined

the requirements. It was just, ‘‘Send us six helicopters, send us

eight people, send us a regiment.’’ And you’d ask why, and that

really wasn’t very clear. ‘‘Just send them. We got to get up to

26,000.’’

And so, right now I think we’ve reached the point where we’ve

got the bulk of people lined up to come. Now we have to be specific

to tailor the needs—tailor the requirements such that the people

that come in now really fill the niches, because what we have there

now is good, in the general sense; we need to really add on to the

specific side.

March, yes.

Yes.

That’s correct. But, there’s a caveat there—

there’s two of them. One is, we’ve been able to do that because Earl

and his team have put together some stopgap and emergency measures

to make that happen. And the other part is, is that we haven’t

really been able to take that capacity and fill all the gaps.

First of all, there was a lot of preexisting gaps that were there.

Second, just because of the way the distribution has been, there are

still gaps that exist. The good part is, is that that is the current

capability that we have, and we have four new NGOs coming back

in. And as we continue to work this—what I’m trying to show is

that we’re going to fix the emergency stopgaps, and make them

more permanent—that’s our effort, and that’s what Earl and I

work on, on a daily basis—but, two, we’re going to try to get back

in and, through efficiencies that we’ve gotten with the—working

with the Sudanese, and the additional capacity of new NGOs coming

in, I believe we can have a significant impact, and that the

future is significantly better, and that we’ve averted what we

thought was going to be a major crisis in the rainy season. I think

we’ve been able to avert that.

That is true, and they’ve helped us with some

key members of al-Qaeda.

Yes, sir.

We are trying very hard to hold to April, but

both sides are reluctant, in some ways, to have elections then. But,

we believe—and the international community supports us—that

those elections are so important, not only for who gets elected, but

the processes.

If we can push through election laws, if we can push through the

voter registration and education programs, if we can push through

the administrative processes of ballots and security and getting

people to the polling stations, if we can do all that, that gives us

a jump on making sure that the referenda in Abyei and Southern

Sudan have a chance of being fair, free, and credible. If we skip the

election, I think it’s going to be very difficult to have free, fair, and

credible referenda.

Yes, sir.

I think it’s a combination of a lot of issues.

And I would just say, in speaking for the U.N.—and while there’s

things that they probably could do better, I’ve got to tell you that,

without the U.N. and without the support to this mission for security

and without the U.N.’s participation in food programs and in

NGOs and the support we’re getting from Ameera-Haq, we

wouldn’t have been able to do half the stuff we’re doing.

U.N. can be looked at as a glass half full and a glass half empty.

I look at them as a glass half full, and I’m a big cheerleader for

the U.N., and I think we need to work hard to help them get the

capacity that they need, as opposed to tearing them down when

they don’t measure up.

So, I think that we’re working hard to ensure that they get the

capability. I think that they’re a capacity that can be used very

productively, both on the humanitarian side and on the security

side. They’re not there yet, but I believe that they can be.

There’s one thing I’d like to add to that. You’re

exactly correct, but the fact that UNMIS and UNAMID can’t cooperate

is disastrous. If there’s a problem in the Three Areas, if

there’s a problem in Southern Sudan, those forces in Darfur can’t

come over to assist. That is something that has to be changed, and

we need to start working interoperability between the U.N. commands

in a more effective way.

Yes, Senator, we have been taking a good hard

look at this, and we have a stoplight chart that evaluates what

they’ve said and what they’re turning into deeds. And we look at

that every week to make sure that they are indeed holding up to

the agreements that they’ve made.

For example, they said they would hold up to the 2007 joint communique,

which meant that they—we only need notification, as

opposed to permission, to travel. And they’re—and we’re seeing evidence

that that’s working.

We—they made an agreement that they would start issuing multiple

entry and exit visas, and they are starting to do that.

We have reached other agreements, in terms of technical agreements.

We had a backlog of up to 6 months in some technical

agreements. They’ve signed about 98 percent of all the technical

agreements.

And so, we are now working the details—like, right now, just

this thing that was brought up about the organization—International

Organization for Migration—we know that if we are going

to get peace, if we’re going to be able to start thinking about people

moving out, we’ve got to do this in a way that their human rights

are guaranteed, and that this is not an involuntary return, but it

is a voluntary return in stability and security. So, we’re working

now with the government to actually work those kinds of aspects.

We’re working with the World Food Programme to start thinking

about, How will we move from humanitarian assistance into development,

so we can start putting in the social networks of waters,

and schools, and health, so that people can move back into these

areas where they want to make their homes in a secure and stable—

and with the human rights that come along with that?

So, I see a lot of positive change. But, we have a program that

says, not ‘‘trust but verify,’’ but ‘‘verify, then trust.’’ And right now

we’re in the verification mode. And when we see more and more

things happening—and I’ve got to tell you honestly, it is now very

positive. But, we also know what we’re up against, and so, we’re

making sure that these are verified and that continue to be

verified. But, as words turn into deeds, there is more trust and

there is more confidence, and we can build on that confidence, not

only on the humanitarian side, but on the security side, on the

political process side, and also in the South.

We have a meeting scheduled in AFRICOM to

discuss this very issue. Right now, I’m not sure. I know what our

requirements are. Our military, as you know, is strapped, in not

only what we have going on in Iraq, but also the plus-up in

Afghanistan and other missions around the world. So, I don’t speak

for them. But, we will lay out our requirements, things we need to

do, and then we’ll try to do this in the most effective way, recognizing

that they have commitments that they have to do.

Thank you.

Yes, thank you very much.

The President has referred to the genocide that is taking place

in Darfur, and that’s very clear to me. And he’s also directed——

You can read that how you need to read it, but

that’s his statement. And what he’s directed me to do is to reverse

the dire ongoing consequences of genocide. And that means to

ensure that militias are disarmed and that displaced people—persons—

can return to homes when they want to and where they

want to, and that the people of Darfur, who have suffered so much,

can continue to live in—or, can live in peace and security and

dignity.

I will tell you in public that Susan Rice is one

of my dear friends. There’s few women in the world that I say ‘‘I

love you’’ to. Susan’s one of them. I love Susan.

And Susan and I talk, and we disagree on some issues, but it is

not a personal thing. And there is not space——

We are.

And by that—and I just say that to say that, you know, there’s

been characterizations of Susan on one side and me on the other

side. There has been honest debate, but that’s why we had the

debate, so that we could come up with a strategy that reflected a

comprehensive and integrated approach to ensure that all elements

were taken care of.

And right now, as I—as you know, we’re focusing on saving lives,

on making sure that people that live in those IDP camps can live

as best they can, and that they have a future.

I’m not saying the genocide’s over. What I’m

saying, though, is that my focus is on recovery. Sir, I’ve been a refugee

myself. We lost everything we owned when we left Congo. I’ve

lived in an attic while waiting to try to find a house. I’ve lived in

people’s clothes. I don’t want people to go through that kind of situation.

I don’t want people to live in that environment. I understand

it, and I’m passionate about changing it, and it really doesn’t matter

what we call it, in my view. What matters is that we have people

living in dire, desperate conditions that must end. We have

women that fear for their lives, and they have their souls ripped

out of them—and that has to stop—as gender violence continues.

My view is that to get involved in a debate that is not required

is not as important to fixing the situation, which is required. That’s

my mandate. That’s what the President has asked me to do. And

that’s why I’ve dedicated 24/7 to do that.

I’ll just give you an example. When I took

over, we had 12 areas where we had major gulfs in implementation

of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We started with 12-houra-

day meetings here in Washington; four of them. We started with

2 days and expanded to another 2. We then went to Khartoum. We

were able to reach agreement on every single one of those 12,

except the census. And I’ve talked to the leadership on both sides,

and we’ll probably resolve that at a political level.

There is benchmarks, there is timetables, and I’ll be very happy

to share with you all those agreements that were made, not

because of us, but because we create the environment so that the

two parties, NCP and SPLM, could make the agreements.

That’s the way I see our role right now, to be able to create the

environment, to help push in areas that we can push, to help use

the leverage of the international community; to push, not for the

United States to make policy there, but to create the environment

so those different views, from the South and the North, can be

rationalized and problems resolved.

We will go out there next month, to raise that agreement that

we got at the working level, with 15 key leaders of both parties,

we’ll raise that up to the two Vice Presidents.

In Darfur, we’re doing the same thing. We’re not pushing the

rebels to unite, we’re creating an environment so that they can

unite. The same with civil society in diasporas around the world.

We’re creating environments where they can come together, identify

their issues, identify their leaders, and then we facilitate them

going to Doha, where we can end up building the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement that’s required to bring peace to Darfur.

So, what I see is, we’re not giving anything. We haven’t given

anything yet, and we’ve got an agreement, 12 pages worth, of

things that they’ve agreed to, not necessarily with us, but things

that will move our shared vision, of what Sudan should be, forward.

That’s what——

We’re trying to achieve.

The specifics? OK.

First of all——

OK. I’ll turn them in to you.

Yup, no problem.

Yes, sir.

Very difficult question. I don’t know. All I

know is that we have a plan to try to make a difference. That plan

includes five tracks in Darfur, which is the political process, the

security elements that I’ve spoken to, the humanitarian assistance

in solving the problem between—the proxy war between Chad and

Sudan. We have an integrated, comprehensive way to fully implement

the CPA. We have—are thinking about what we can do to

stabilize the eastern security pact and the NGOs that are sitting

there on the eastern side.

All I can do is work all these problems together as hard as I can.

We’ve assembled the best team that I can. We have bright, bright

people that are helping us. We are pulling in expertise from the

whole international community. We are building international

organizations to help us do this.

We don’t say that the United States can solve this problem. But,

we believe there is a solution, and we also believe that we cannot

fail. There’s too many people whose lives are depending on our success.

And that’s why we’re putting together every effort we can,

and that’s why President Obama has given me the support he’s

given me and Secretary Clinton has been totally supportive,

because we all understand that this is the one where we have

to——

Our timeframe is, is that we have an election

in April of next year, and we have a referendum in June. The number

of days left, working days, is 174 until the election, 362 until

the referendum. That is almost ‘‘mission impossible.’’ But, I believe

that there’s hope. I believe that we can succeed, and that’s why I

get up every day, and I’m at work at 6 o’clock, 7 days a week, to

make this thing happen. We have a terribly compressed timeline,

we have an almost impossible job to do, but if we sit back and do

nothing, we will certainly fail. I’m giving it everything I can,

because I believe that there’s hope.

No, I don’t.

Time is a big one. The second thing is, we

need some space on sanctions. There are things that we are doing

and sanctioning that are hindering me from being able to bring

development to the South. There are things that are hindering me

because of sanctions that are keeping the people of Sudan from getting

the education they need.

I have a simple radio that’s a doctor and a BlackBerry that connects

up to five leading institutions so that doctors in Darfur and

the South and around can call in and get the latest medical help,

and I can’t even distribute them, because of the sanctions.

The trains, the very elements that we need, and equipment that

we need to develop the South, can’t come through Port Sudan or

Khartoum because it’s all sanctioned. We have to take a good look

and say what can we do to ensure that the Southern Sudanese

have every opportunity to be birthed as a nation that’s not in an

incubator, but one that can survive on its own?

And I will tell you that there—we have worked issues and put

ourselves in the proverbial box in some areas. We’re going to need

some help from the Congress in those areas.

Well, obviously all the elements of soft power

are things that we’re trying to use. But, what it really comes down

to is making a difference with the NGOs that have the capacity—

I mean, increasing the capacity for the NGOs to work, it means

bringing more development in, and it means having a more integrated

development program—rural development programs, poverty

reduction plans—that the Sudanese themselves come up with.

And that’s what we’re asking people in Juba to do, is come up with

their plan and then figure out how we can work with them on their

plan to make them successful.

It really isn’t about us doing it, it’s about us helping them help

themselves, and the African region to help itself. And that’s what

we’re trying to do.

The numbers fluctuate between 175 and

300,000.

Yes, I believe that they will honor the vote,

and I believe that—the agreements that we’ve made right now, the

North and the South have agreed to delink legislations, such that

the vote will take place with or without the required legislation.

So, I believe that the vote will happen. And what we understand,

that if the vote happened today, they would probably vote to

secede, but we’ll see what happens in 2011. But, I think that they

will allow it to happen.

That’s what we’re working for. We’re working

for full implementation of the CPA that will allow, at the vote, for

there to be unity or a peaceful coexistence. That’s what we’re striving

for with our negotiations and the work that we’re doing.

Yes. This is a definitional issue, and what I

can do is only describe what I see.